
#### **MDAI 2018**


# Attacker Models with a Variety of Background Knowledge of Payment History

Satoshi Ito, Hiroaki Kikuchi (Meiji University) Hiroshi Nakagawa (RIKEN Center for Advanced Intelligence Project)

### What is De-identification?




### What is De-identification?



## Attacker and Background Knowledge

#### Exam Results

ID	Math	English	Physics
Α	90	50	70
В	90	50	60
С	90	70	70
D	50	70	60
Е	50	50	80
F	50	50	10
G	30	70	80
Н	30	70	10



#### Attacker $\alpha$ Attacker and Background Knowledge **Exam Results Physics** English ID Math Mr. Ito's English The risk of Mr. Ito 90 **50** 70 Α grade must be 50 by attacker X Β 90 **50** 60 $=\frac{1}{4}(25\%)$ 90 70 70 С Attacker $\beta$ 70 60 50 D 50 80 Ε **50** F 50 **50** 10 The risk of Mr. Ito 70 80 G 30 by attacker Y **Mr. Ito's Physics** Η 30 70 10 grade must be 10 $=\frac{1}{2}(50\%)$

#### Attacker $\alpha$ Attacker and Background Knowledge **Exam Results Physics** Math English ID **Mr. Ito's English** 9( Α grade must be 50 The risk of data Β 9( depends on the Attacker's 9( С Attacker $\beta$ 5( D background knowledge Ε 5( F 50 **50** 10 The risk of Mr. Ito 30 70 G 80 by attacker Y **Mr. Ito's Physics** Н 30 70 10 grade must be 10 $=\frac{-2}{2}(50\%)$

## Research Question

- What kind of background knowledge is risky?
- Which attribute is the riskiest in data?

#### Solution

 We propose a theoretical risk model which allows to quantify risk without developing re-identification programs.


## Sample Data


#### Transaction sample data of 4 users in 3 days


ID	User ID	Receipt ID	Date	Time	Goods	Price	Number	
1	А	1	2010/12/1	8:45	Apple	1	10	
2	С	2	2010/12/1	10:20	Cup	1	30	
3	D	3	2010/12/1	16:40	Book	10	5	
4	В	4	2010/12/2	9:00	Apple	2	50	
5	С	4	2010/12/2	10:00	Book	100	2	<b>≻</b> <sup>9</sup> .
6	D	4	2010/12/2	20:00	Cup	20	5	records
7	А	5	2010/12/3	6:10	Apple	1	10	
8	В	6	2010/12/3	10:00	Book	5	5	
9	D	7	2010/12/3	12:20	Cup	50	1	J

## Sample Data

#### Transaction sample data of 4 users in 3 days








## Transformed Sample Data


ID	User ID	Receipt ID	Date	Time	Goods	Price	Number
1	А	1	2010/12/1	8:45	Apple	1	10
2	С	2	2010/12/1	10:20	Cup	1	30
•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••




User ID/Date	2010/12/1	2010/12/2	2010/12/3
Α	Apple	-	Apple
В	-	Apple	Book
С	Сир	Book	-
D	Book	Сир	Сир



#### Mean Identification Probability Pr(identify, X)



### Mean Identification Probability Pr(identify, X)



### Assumption 1 for Modeling

#### X: an element of the set of background knowledge. R<sub>X</sub>: set of records that satisfy X U<sub>X</sub>: set of users that satisfy X

Assumption 1: |R

Transaction sample data of 4 users  $U_{v}^{3} = \{A, C, D\}$ 

ID	User ID	Receipt ID	Date	Time	$ \boldsymbol{R}_X  =  \boldsymbol{U}_X  = 3$		
1	А	1	2010/12/1	8:45			10
2	С	2	2010/12/1	10:20	Cup	1	30
3	D	3	2010/12/1	16:40	Book	10	5
4	В	4	2010/12/2	9:00	Apple	2	50
•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••

 $R_X = \{1, 2, 3\}$ 

## Modeling of Risk of Attackers

#### *m*: number of records *X*: an element of the set of background knowledge D(X). $\omega_X = |D(X)|$

#### Theorem 4.1

When  $|U_X| = |R_X|$ , the mean identification probability is  $Pr(\text{attacked with } X) = \sum_{X \in D(X)} \frac{1}{|U_X|} \frac{|R_X|}{m} = \frac{\omega_X}{m}$ 

## Assumption 2 for Modeling

p(X): the probability of gaining background knowledge X p(Y): the probability of gaining background knowledge Y

#### Assumption 2: p(X,Y) = p(X)p(Y)(X and Y are independent)

#### Example: *X* = "2010/12/1", *Y* = "*Apple*"

Goods ID /Date	2010/12/1	2010/12/2	2010/12/3
Apple	1	1	1
Book	1	1	1
Сир	1	1	1

### Assumption 2 for Modeling

 $p(X = "2010/12/1") = \frac{1}{3}, \quad p(Y = "100") = \frac{1}{3}$  $p(X = "2010/12/1")p(Y = "100") = \frac{1}{9}$ = p(X = "2010/12/1", Y = "100")

#### Example: *X* = "2010/12/1", *Y* = "*Apple*"

Goods ID /Date	2010/12/1	2010/12/2	2010/12/3
Apple	1	1	1
Book	1	1	1
Сир	1	1	1

# Modeling of Risk of Attackers

#### *m*: number of records *X*,*Y*: an element of the set of background knowledge D(X), D(Y) in table *T*. $\omega_X = |D(X)|$ , $\omega_Y = |D(Y)|$

Theorem 4.2

When assumption 1, 2 are satisfied, the mean identification probability is

 $Pr(\text{attacked with } X, Y) = \frac{\omega_X \omega_Y}{m}$ 


## Actual value and Accuracy of Our Model

ID/date	2010/12/1	2010/12/2	2010/12/3	Attacker 5
А	Apple	-	Apple	
В	-	Apple	Book	
С	Сир	Book	-	
D	Book	Сир	Cup	

Pr(attacked with date) = 
$$\frac{\omega_{date}}{m} = \frac{3}{9} = \frac{1}{3}$$
  
Acutual value =  $\frac{1}{9} + \frac{1}{9} + \frac{1}{9} = \frac{1}{3}$ 

## Evaluation of Our Model

#### Transaction data of 400 users in 1 year





## **Experimental Results**


Attacker	Actual value	Theoretical value	When	How many kinds	What
0	0.0025	0.0025	-	-	-
1	0.0965	0.0730	-	-	One
2	0.0807	0.0030	-	$\checkmark$	-
3	0.7974	8.3240	-	$\checkmark$	One
4	0.9788	4.5440	-	$\checkmark$	All
5	0.1851	0.0076	$\checkmark$	-	-
6	0.8945	21.1700	$\checkmark$	-	One
7	0.9400	0.8680	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	-
8	0.9750	2415.0000	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	One
9	0.9994	1319.0000	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	All

#### Discussion

Scatter plot of  $|R_X|$  and  $|U_X|$ *x*-axis:  $|R_X|$ , *y*-axis:  $|U_X|$ Red Line:  $|R_X| = |U_X|$ 







### Conclusions

- We proposed 10 types of attackers with background knowledge about 400 and evaluated the risk (mean identification probability) associated with these attackers.
- We found that date is the most useful for attackers among three kinds of background knowledge: purchase date, number of kinds, and knowledge of one good purchased.
- We demonstrated that the risk can be theoretically estimated without computing it exactly under two assumptions.